Case Notes: Regimes Matrimoniaux
MOOROONGAPILLAY VS CUNDUN 1962 MR 60
The Civil Code contains no special provision relating to the mutual obligation binding on natural parents and their acknowledged children as regards alimentary allowances. It is universally admitted, however, that an acknowledged natural child may be entitled to an alimentary allowance from his parents.
Whether this allowance may be sued for by the parent having' the custody of the child acting in his own name or in the name of the child is a question which raises subtle considerations.
In Mauritius there is no legal guardianship of illegitimate children, the Guardians to Illegitimate Children Ordinance (Cap. 41) providing only for a dative guardian, who is, under section 4 of that Ordinance, to be, by preference, the father who has acknowledged his illegitimate child unless good cause be shown to the contrary; in the matter of custody, it is the well-established jurisprudence of this Court that the principal consideration when choosing a custodian-father, mother or even third party-is the interest of the child.
If, in the interest of the child, a mother is entrusted with its custody whilst the father is appointed guardian, it is not difficult to imagine the complications which may stand in the way of the mother for enforcing the contribution of a reluctant father to the upkeep of his child, unless the mother is entitled to sue in her own name or at least as representative of her minor child.
THE COLONIAL GOVERNMENT v. CLOSEL 1949 MR 1
A child who is actually dans le besoin has a right to claim an alimentary allowance from his parents; that right springs from the very fact of the child finding himself in straitened circumstances, and the legal duty cast upon his parents to pay an alimentary allowance exists from the very moment the child is in want without it being necessary for the child to claim it.
It is established jurisprudence that under art. 203- C,.C. parents are jointly responsible for the maintenance, feeding and education of their minor children, so long as their children are under 18 years of age, i.e., whilst the parents have still the legal usufruct of the properties belonging to their minor children. There is also authority to the effect that third parties who have not even been authorized by parents but have nevertheless through necessity and without intention de libéralité provided for minor children can claim as negotiorum gestor against parents the refund of the sums advanced by them provided their administration has been useful to the Children.
It seems therefore that it is for a child claiming alimony, to make a prima facie case, “à deposer son bilan," and to establish that he has no means and needs assistance subject to that contention being rebutted by the other party.
Of course the "débiteur d'aliments" can always prove that he has not the means to provide for the alimony.
We read in Planiol et Ripert, Vol. 2 para. 32:
Pour que les aliments soient dûs il faut deux conditions:
(1) Le créancier d'aliments doit être dans le besoin.
(2) Le débiteur doit être en état de les fournir.”
CAUSSY v CAUSSY 1995 MR 46/1995 SCJ 160
The main bone of contention between the parties is whether the wife should go on accepting the choice of the conjugal roof made by the husband and the seat of which appears to be the place of the husband's parents, or whether, of a common accord, they should seek some other accommodation.
Under article 215 of the Civil Code "la résidence de la famille est un lieu qu'ils (les époux) choisissent d'un commun accord'.
The situation is similar under English Law. In Dunn-Dunn (1948) 2 All ER 822 it was held that:
"There is no provision of law that a husband has the right to say where the matrimonial home should be. The decision where the home is to be is one affecting both parties and their children, and it is the duty of the parties to decide it by agreement, each having an equal voice. If such an arrangement is frustrated by the unreasonableness of one or the other and this leads to a separation, then the party who has produced the separation by reason of his or her unreasonable behaviour is guilty of desertion."
It is clear, in the present case, that the abandonment of the roof by the respondent has been the doing of the husband, who, by closing his eyes to the obvious, namely the constant nagging of his wife by the in‑laws, left her no choice. Such conduct on the part of a husband makes him the guilty party.
Carosin v Carosin 1996 MR 182/1996 SCJ 345
Learned Counsel for the respondent has objected to the application on the ground that such an application can be entertained by the Judge in Chambers, only if there are divorce proceedings pending before the Court at the time that the Judge in Chambers is seized.
The power given to Judge under section 240 alinéa 2 is not one which should be exercised lightly. There must be strong reasons which can justify an order requiring one of the spouses to leave the conjugal roof. The circumstances must be such that no other alternative can be envisaged. Whilst not limiting the application of the article to a situation where one of the spouses is in some sort of danger physical or emotional, this factor to my mind is one which must be predominant in an application like the present one.
In Verloppe v. Verloppe [1994] SCJ 292, the application was refused on the question of delay, nevertheless I stated that a spouse may apply for an injunction to exclude the other from the matrimonial home on the ground that he is in imminent danger, be it physical or emotional, and he undertakes to institute proceedings in the near future.
Verloppe v Verloppe 1996 MR 75/1996 SCJ 169
It is true that the power to “attribuer” to one of the spouses “la jouissance du logement et du mobilier du ménage”, is, under article 240 of our Civil Code, conferred upon the Judge in Chambers, and that power is clearly in the nature of a provisional measure “à la suite d’une demande en divorce” in the terms of article 239 of the Code.
It is also true that no other article of our Civil code unequivocally provides for the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain an application for exclusive use and occupation of the matrimonial home irrespective of the filing of a divorce petition.
Does the Supreme Court, however, not otherwise derive jurisdiction to entertain such cases?
As neither the Intermediate nor the District Court has jurisdiction to deal with such cases, it is obvious that the Court which would have jurisdiction in the circumstances is the Supreme Court which, by virtue of section 76 of the Constitution, has “unlimited jurisdiction to hear and determine any civil or criminal proceedings under any law other than a disciplinary law”, and, by virtue of section 15 of the Courts Act, has “in addition to any other jurisdiction conferred on it [....] all the powers and judicial jurisdiction necessary to administer the laws of Mauritius.”
Ramdahin v Beeharry 1996 SCJ 212
The Court held that the plaintiff’s action and the sale of the “logement de la famille” be declared null and void is not maintainable inasmuch as it falls foul of the provisions of article 216 of our Civil Code.
MURUGAN V MURUGAN 2003 SCJ 169
It is the contention of the plaintiff that her late husband had fraudulently, maliciously and without her consent or authorisation sold the land on which stands the matrimonial home which she claimed to be the co-owner and which formed part of the legal community existing between them.
The plaintiff had entered her action more than a year when she was aware of the sale. “L’action intentée par le conjoint plus d’un an après qu’il ait eu connaissance de l’acte est prescrite. Elle doit être intentée dans l’année à partir du jour où il a eu connaissance de l’acte. En cas de contestation sur ce point, c’est à la personne qui invoque la déchéance que la preuve incombe (Cass. 1er civ. 6 avr.1994. JCP 1995.I.13821, no.1. obs. G.Wiederkehr..) Il faut non seulement que l’époux ait eu connaissance de l’acte, mais encore qu’il ait su qu’il s’agissait d’un acte au sens de l’article 215.”
Sondhoo v The HSBC ltd 1999 MR 160/1999 SCJ 358
The clear language of art. 216 C.C., however, shows that the “droits par lesquels est assuré le logement de la famille” cannot be disposed of by one spouse without the consent of the other, whatever be the juridical régime of the property, “bien commun” or “bien propre”, and this in line with the general philosophy of the reform brought about to the Civil Code in 1980 and more especially the provisions relating to the “logement de la famille”.
Moreover, in an article published in the 1982 issue of the Mauritius Law Review, Prof. Robert Garron, who was instrumental in the drafting of the amending legislation of 1982 has this to say:
Sur le plan théorique, l’article 216 consacre la primauté de l’intérêt de la famille sur l’intérêt particulier des époux. En effet, même si le logement appartient en propre à tel ou tel époux, celui-ci ne peut plus en disposer librement, dès lors que ce bien a été affecté à une destination familiale. Cette dérogation à la règle de la libre disposition des propres, règle aujourd’hui générale dans tous les régimes matrimoniaux légaux, constitue une illustration particulière remarquable de l’influence de la destination sur le régime juridique d’un bien. Parce que le bien propre d’un époux a désormais une “destination familiale”, son régime juridique cesse d’être celui d’un propre, pour devenir, sur le plan de la disposition, celui d’un bien commun. Les deux époux doivent apporter leur concours à cet acte de disposition.
As the second respondent has, without the consent of the applicant, created in favour of the first respondent a fixed charge over the “logement de la famille”, I equally consider that it would not be unreasonable for a court to hold that the fixed charge is null and void.
In Aubeelock v Aubeelock and Ors. [1999 MR 199], the sale of the “bien propre” of one of the spouse which was used as the “logement de famille” was declared null and void as it was sold without the knowledge and consent of the other spouse
BOUTON v MCB LTD 2005 SCJ 60
It is the contention of the applicant that without his consent, her wife had burdened the matrimonial home to the respondent and that, in the circumstances, the charge was null and void.
Article 216 of the Civil Code provides that-
“les époux ne peuvent l’un sans l’autre disposer des droits par lequels est assuré le logement de la famille, ni des meubles dont il est garni.
Celui des deux qui n’a pas donné son consentement à l’acte peut en demander l’annulation. L’action en nullité lui est ouvert dans l’année à partir du jour où il a eu connaissance de l’acte, sans pouvoir jamais être intentée plus d’un an après que le règime matrimonial s’est dissous.”
This article finds no application where the spouses have elected to be governed by the system of legal separation as is the marriage of the applicant to his wife.
SEWPAL v SEWPAL 2008 SCJ 127
We need not add that the obligations resulting from a marriage bond remain the commitment of the couple as per the provisions of the civil code, more especially:
(a) article 212 respecting obligations of fidelity, support and assistance that they owe to each other;
(b) article 213 whereby they ensure together the moral and material obligations of the family and the upbringing of the offspring;
(c) article 215 whereby the couple engage to a “communaute de vie” and decide to elect their place of stay “d’un commun accord” remembering that in this case if they had decided to stay there together one could not just walk out of the agreement without the consent of the other.
PAW CHIN CHAN CHIANG MARIE DESIRE JOE V MRS RAMBURN BASDEO 2003 SCJ 120
The appellant who is the owner of an immoveable property applied for a writ Habere Facias Possessionem before the Judge in Chambers against the respondent on the ground that she was an illegal occupier.The question in law before the Judge in Chambers was whether the respondent was an illegal occupier following the surrender of the tenancy by her husband or whether, pursuant to Article 216 of the Civil Code, the respondent’s rights over the conjugal home had not been preserved since the surrendering of the tenancy was done behind her back.
We share the view of learned Counsel for the appellant that the Act which specifically governs unfurnished premises is a special law whilst article 216 of the Civil Code which refers to rights that ensure the maintenance of the conjugal roof, regardless of the nature of the tenancy, is in that sense more in the nature of a general law. A special law should be preferred to a general law when there are contradictions and a special Act is not repealed by a general Act unless an intention to repeal is expressed or necessarily implied: “Specialia generalibus derogant, non generalia specialibus.”
In Barker v. Edgard & Ors [1898 A.C. 748], a privy Council decision which is cited in Chinien v. The Queen & Ors [1989 MR 262] Lord Hobhouse made the following observations:
“The general maxim is Generalia specialibus non derogant. When the Legislature has given its attention to a separate subject, and made provision for it, the presumption is that a subsequent general enactment is not intended to interfere with the special provision unless it manifested that intention very clearly. Each enactment must be construed in that respect according to its own subject matter and its own terms.”
The same principle applies in French law too and is aptly stated in Encyclopédie Dalloz, Vo Lois note 117, viz.:
“L’adoption d’une loi générale laisse survivre la loi spéciale antérieure qui fera exception au texte postérieur. De même une loi spéciale postérieure déroge à la loi générale antérieure qui n’est pas abrogée. Dans les deux cas la solution est que la loi spéciale l’emporte sur la loi générale, mais strictement en son domaine. Encore faut-il déterminer dans le premier cas l’intention du législateur: il a pu vouloir abroger la loi spéciale antérieure par la loi générale postérieure. Mais il faut alors que cette intention résulte clairement de l’objet ou de l’esprit de cette loi.»
In the light of what we have said we are of the view that in law the respondent had no valid defence to resist the writ Habere Facias Possessionem since the tenancy under the Act held by her husband had come to an end upon his surrendering the tenancy.
DOOKUN v DOOKUN 1993 SCJ 430
Encyclopédie Dalloz Civil Vol 1 Vo Alimentaire -
Sect. 1er - Notion d' obligation alimentaire
Art. 1et - Principes Fondamentaux
1. Le code civil, en établissant entre parents et alliés proche une obligation dont l' objet consiste en des «aliments», entend par là tout ce qui est nécessaire la vie du créancier alimentaire: nourriture, vêtements, chauffage, éclairage, logement, santé, etc. (Trib. civ. Seine, 8 févr. 1909, D. P. 1909.5. 17; Civ. 28 févr. 1938, D.J. 1938.241; Lyon, 13 nov. 1952, D. 1953.755, note P. Gervésie; V. cep., pour des frais médicaux exceptionnels occasionnés par un accident, Trib. grande inst. Seine, 19 févr. 1966, D. 1966.428). L’objet de la dette alimentaire ainsi conçue progresse en même temps que le niveau de vie général de notre époque. Il faut, aujourd' hui, y comprendre des prestations que le code civil ne considérait pas comme nécessaires. A un moindre degré, la nécessité des prestations alimentaires varie d'après les habitudes de vie du milieu auquel appartient le créancier alimentaire.“
The above principle has now (on 20 November 1989) been embodied in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. Mauritius has adhered to the Convention.
“L'article 27 reconnait à tout enfant le droit à un niveau de vie adéquat; et ses parents ont la responsabilité de le lui assurer même quand l' un d' entre eux ou même les deux ne vivent pas avec l'enfant."
Seewoopaul B. v Mrs K. Sewraj 1995 SCJ 282
The present application rests on article 218 of the Civil Code which stipulates:
218. Un époux peut être autorisé par le Juge en Chambre à passer seul un acte pour lequel le concours ou le consentement de son conjoint serait nécessaire, si celui-ci est hors d’état de manifester sa volonté ou si son refus n’est pas justifié par l’intérêt de la famille.
L’acte passé dans les conditions fixées par l’autorisation du Juge en Chambre est opposable à l’époux dont le concours ou le consentement a fait défaut, sans qu’il en résulte à sa charge aucune obligation personnelle.
We are here concerned with the second alinea, viz: “Le refus n’est pas justifié par l’intérêt de la famille”. See Observation du Professeur René Théry - J.C.P. (1974) 17620:
......les tribunaux n’exigent pas une preuve qui ait la rigueur d’une démonstration scientifique; ils se contentent d’une sérieuse probabilité qui puisse entraîner leur conviction.
See also Gazette du Palais - 1973 .1er sem. from a decision of the Cour d’Appel de Grenoble delivered on 7 November 1972 where it was held:-
Il n’appartient pas au juge de dire quelle est la solution la meilleure dans l’intérêt de la famille ou d’opérer un choix entre l’intérêt de la famille et l’intérêt personnel de l’un des époux.
Il convient seulement de constater que la preuve n’est pas rapportée que le refus du conjoint n’est pas justifié par l’intérêt de la famille.
In the above case the authorisation sought was granted as the refusal “était inspiré non par l’intérêt de la famille, mais par le seul esprit de chicane”.
The spirit of article 218 is to protect the goods belonging to the community especially where there are matrimonial problems. The Court should be even more cautious when seized with an application by a spouse who has faulted and then poses himself as “le défenseur de la famille”.
RAJABALEE ZAFAR AHMED Versus RAJABALEE RAHELA BIBI 1992 SCJ 96
The applicant is seeking a decree ordering his wife to give her consent to live at St Paul. There is an alternative prayer for a declaration by me to the effect that the Respondent’s refusal to live at St Paul constitutes an abuse of marital obligations by the respondent
I do not consider that Article 215 which was cited to me can be helpful because it only ensures that the residence of the family should be in the house and in the place chosen by the spouses by common accord. Nor do I think that the matter can be decided in accordance with Article 218 of the Civil Code as it was submitted. That article empowers a spouse to have the authority of a Judge in Chambers to perform singly an act which needs the consent of his or her spouse in the case where the latter is unable to express his or her wish or intention or is unreasonably and without justification refusing to give his or her consent.
Babboo v Gunnoo 1992 MR 75/1992 SCJ 143
Article 217 of the Civil Code now gives each spouse "la pleine capacité de droit" to enter an action on her own accord. Learned counsel further cited to me articles 1421 and 1424 of the Civil Code which concern the administration of the property belonging to the legal community. They are really not relevant to the issue. The only article which comes near to the point is article 1426. It empowers a spouse to refer to the Judge in Chambers if he wants to be substituted in the place of his spouse in the administration of the common property. But I must point out that such substitution can only be effected if (1) the other spouse is unable to exercise his will i.e. "hors d'état de manifester sa volonté", or (2) his management or "gestion" is tainted with fraud, or (3) he is unfit to discharge his duties as administrator.
That article is also not applicable because in the present case, the applicant is not asking me to substitute him in the place of his wife to effect the sale. He wants to bypass the respondent's consent and to that effect is seeking an order for the sale to proceed without the participation of the respondent.
RAMSAHAYE DOORPATEEA v DHANANTAR RAMSAHAYE 1994 SCJ 359B
This is an application by the wife Applicant for an order to substitute her in the place of her husband as administrator of the properties of the legal community existing between them. The application is made under Art. 1462-1 of the Civil Code and the only ground invoked is that the husband was inapt to administer the properties of the community.
It does not mean that because he wants to administer the property the way he had been doing before the dispute with his children makes him suddenly inapt. On the contrary, I believe that it was the children who wanted to dictate the old man. The application is set aside. I make no order as to costs.
Halkhory S. v Halkhory G. 2000 SCJ 184
Article 1424 of the Civil Code stipulates quite clearly that the consent of both spouses is a prerequisite to the disposal of immovable property belonging to the community of goods between the two spouses. The Judge in Chambers may authorise one of the spouses to dispose of property without the concurrence of the other spouse where the latter is either incapacitated or if the latter's refusal is not to the advantage of the family.
(Article 218 of our Civil Code). As to what constitutes "'interêt de la famille" is a matter of appreciation for the Judge after having heard both parties. See the interesting comments of Champenois in Recueil Dalloz Sirey 1989 following a decision of the Tribunal de Grande Instance de Grenoble - 25 Juillet 1989 –
"On mesure ainsi combien il est difficile de déterminer l'intérêt de la famille
lorsqu'une séparation est déjà intervenue entre les époux. Ceux-ci ont
spontanément une vision divergente de l'avenir. En l'espèce, la femme cherche
légitimement à préserver l'acquis et se montre soucieuse avant tout de sécurité.
Quant au mari, il entend poursuivre ses activités professionnelles, redevenir
entrepreneur (à un niveau plus élevé, semble-t-il) et admet difficilement que sa
femme tout à la fois refuse le divorce (ou la séparation de corps) et lui interdise
une gestion normale des biens communs.
LAURICOURT vs APPADOO and anor 1982 MR 313
The question which has to be decided is whether the nullity which taints an act made without the consent of the wife is absolute or, in view of article 1427 which provides “si l'un des époux a outrepassé ses pouvoirs sur les biens communs. L'autre à moins qu'il n'ait ratifié l'acte, peut en demander l'annulation” is only a relative one. The question is not free from difficulty but it would seem that even if “l'action est reservée à l'époux dont le consentement aurait été nécessaire pour accomplir valablement l'acte” the applicant, as an ayant cause, may have a right to exercise the action.
LAW WAN L.T. v FONG MAN J. & ANOR 2006 SCJ 207
The plaintiff is challenging the validity of the purported sale of a property situated at Jardin La Bonté in Rodrigues (“the property”) which was effected by the second defendant in favour of the first defendant on 10 September 1990.
The community of goods had already been dissolved on 12 September 1980 i.e. prior to 31 October 1980, and the spouses had already, by virtue of articles 1441 and 1478 of the Civil Code, become co-owners holding equal and undivided rights in the property following the dissolution of the community. I find that it has been established by the plaintiff on the basis of the undisputed facts that the second defendant had no right to effect any sale of the property to the first defendant as he purported to do on 10 September 1990.
Naujeer v Registrar of Civil Status and Ministère Public 1991 MR 117/1991 SCJ 237
Section 7 of Act No. 45 of 1990 [Civil Status (Amendment No 2) Act 1990] amended the Code Napoléon by deleting, in articles 335, 342, 762 and 764, any reference to adulterine children. This means that, without going as far as the French loi du 3 janvier 1972, which not only abolished the formerly existing different categories of natural child but also gave equal rights to natural and legitimate children, it is now feasible, on the one hand, for a biological parent to recognize his or her adulterine child and for such a child to enter an action "en recherche de paternité ou de maternité", while, on the other, reciprocal rights of succession can exist between an adulterine child whose filiation is established and his or her parent.
Her Majesty's Procureur & Advocate General for Mauritius vs. Bruneau 1866 MR 169
We think there could be little if any, doubt that natural children ought to be considered as "descendants" within the meaning of these Articles. It was said, indeed on the part of the Appellant, that the word "descendants", ex vi termini, signifies those who are capable by law of succeeding; that it, of necessity, refers to the known legal course of inheritance: but however this may be, when the word is applied to a settled and recognized course of descent, it cannot, we think, be so when it is applied to a line of succession newly created by law, and created in favour of persons not falling within the settled and recognized course of descent. At all events, we think that this position on the part of the Appellant cannot be supported against the opposing indicia of intention to which we have referred.
ARRETS SUR LE CONJOINT SURVIVANT
BUNJUN V. DABEE-BUNJUN 1984 MR 94
The applicant invokes, as her exclusive right to the possession of the first floor of the house, the right of usufruct to which, as surviving spouse, she is entitled under the provision of art. 768 of our Code Civil. The premises to which those provisions apply are those which “au jour du décès servaient au logement principal du ménage". The averment by the applicant that the first floor of the house so servait au logement principal du ménage on the death of Seegobin Bunjun is denied by the respondent. The contention of the latter is that the house comprised two distinct units, the ground floor and the first floor and that only the former "servait au logement principal du ménage", and accordingly the applicant's right of usufruct is restricted to the ground floor only.
Art. 832 of our Code Civil provides that a surviving spouse "peut toujours demander l'attribution préférentielle par voie de partage de l'immeuble, des meubles meublants et des droits immobiliers qui appartenaient .....à la communauté et qui au jour du décès, servaient au logement principal du ménage". While there are no provisions in the French Code corresponding to those of our art. 768, art. 382 of the French Code provides that "Le conjoint survivant ou tout héritier co-propriétaire peut également demander l'attribution préférentielle ......de la propriété on du droit de bail du local qui lui sert effectivement d'habitation, s'il y avait sa résidence à l'époque du décès".
It has been consistently held by the French Courts that the subject matter of a claim for such "attribution préférentielle" was to be restricted to that part only of an immovable property "servant effectivement d'habitation au demandeur" and not to "l'intégralité de l’immeuble” (Vide Dalloz Encyclopédie Juridique (2ème édition) Répertoire de Droit Civil, Vo.Partage No. 679). This restriction appears clearly from Nos. 24 and 25 of Gaz. du Pal. 1967.1 Sommaire (Partage) which read:
24. Selon l'Art. 832(5) et (6) les seuls locaux d'habitations pouvant faire l'objet d'une attribution préférentielle sont ceux que l'héritier habitait effectivement et dans lesquels il avait sa résidence à l’époque du décès.
25. Il s'ensuit que l'héritier qui n'habitait qu'une partie de l'immeuble dont il demande I'attribution préférentielle ne peut se voir attribuer que les quatres pièces qu'il habitait au moment du décès de son père.
I am satisfied that such a restriction is similarly applicable to the right of the surviving spouse to l'attribution préférentielle par voie de partage under our Art. 832 as well as to the right of usufruct under our Art. 768.
MOHUN S v MOHUN A 2006 SCJ 140
The appellant’s claim to a usufruct was based on Article 768 of our Civil Code, first alinea which reads as follows:
“Nonobstant les droits des héritiers réservataires et sous réserve des dispositions de l’alinéa 3, le conjoint survivant dispose, en outre, d’un droit d’usufruit sur l’immeuble, sur les meubles meublants et sur les droits immobiliers qui appartenaient au défunt et qui, au jour du décès, servaient au logement principal du ménage, au cas où ceux-ci auraient une valeur totale supérieure au montant de la part effectivement dévolue au conjoint survivant, compte tenu des libéralités et des dispositions testamentaires et ne pourraient ainsi lui être entièrement attribués en
application des articles 767 et 770.” (emphasis added)
The appellant did not state in either of her two affidavits, or establish by any other form of evidence, the facts which would make the above article applicable to her, not even the fact that the premises in lite “servaient au logement principal du ménage” at the time of her late husband’s death.
POTHIMAH V. POTHIMAH 2002 SCJ 210
Pursuant to Art. 767 of the Civil Code, the co-defendant would also have a share in her late husband’s succession together with the plaintiff and defendant no.1. However, although under Art. 768 and Art. 769, she, as the surviving spouse has an unequivocal right of usufruct over the logement principal – she is not by law an heritière reservataire – in which case her late husband Ramsamy Pothimah had a right to either reduce or dispose of the share that would have accrued her as the surviving spouse.
This is clearly borne out in Art. 770 which provides that:
« La part du conjoint survivant peut être réduite ou supprimée par la volonté du défunt, clairement manifestée dans un testament, ainsi que par l’effet des libéralités consenties par celui ci. »
In the circumstances, being given that the co-defendant had consented to the sale of the land and that the late Ramsamy Pothimah could dispose of the codefendant’s share in both properties and thus leaving as sole heirs to his succession his two children, the plaintiff and the defendant, he was entitled to 1/3 of the value of the assets of the succession as his quotité disponible by application of Art. 913.
I take into account Mr. Ramlakhan’s evidence that the total value of the two plots at the time of the sale was Rs. 1,250,000/- (Rs. 750,000 + Rs. 500,000), the quotité disponible of the late Ramsamy Pothimah amounted to Rs. 416,670 (1/3 of Rs. 1,250,000), leaving a balance of Rs. 833,330/- to be shared between the plaintiff and the defendant. The plaintiff, therefore is entitled to the sum of Rs. 416,670 as her share in the succession.
Bijlall Busgeeth v Avedanand Busgeeth 1997 SCJ 236
The reform that was made in the Code Napoléon (Amendment) Act 1980 in relation to the right of the surviving spouse, as provided by article 768, does not have its counterpart in France from where we normally derive guidance for the application of our Civil Code. However, I was referred to an article in The Mauritius Law Review No. 3 (1980 Mru. L.R. 42) by Professor Garron, in which he expressed his opinion as to the purport and the essential requirements of article 768. The two vital conditions of the right of usufruct of the surviving spouse sur le logement familial as put by the author at p. 49 are:
1. que la part d’héritage du conjoint survivant ne soit pas suffisante pour que le logement familial lui soit entièrement attribué,
2. que cette part d’héritage soit préalablement et obligatoirement imputée sur le logement familial.
The aim of the reform was to provide a protection so that “le conjoint survivant ne soit pas chassé de son logement par les autres cohéritiers, souvent empressés d’effectuer le partage. (1980) Mru. L.R. p. 49 ........ mais sans que l’usufruit puisse être utilisé en vue d’augmenter indûment sa part d’héritage.” (1980) Mru L.R. p. 52.
Rapports/Donations
Chumroo H. & Anor v B.A. Dilmahomed & Anor 1996 SCJ 317
Has there been a “donation déguisée” to defendant No. 2?
If yes, should he be ordered to bring back the “don” into hotchpotch?
The questions that arise are whether plaintiff No. 1 could ask that the alleged donation be brought back into hotchpotch and whether defendant No. 2 could be so ordered. I agree with learned Counsel for the defendants that plaintiff No. 1 has no locus standi and no such action could be brought against defendant No. 2. Are of assistance the following:-
(1) Jurisclasseur Civil Vo. “Succession” art. 842-857 “Rapports Fasc. A” note 1
1. Le rapport de libéralités est une ancienne et importante institution du droit successoral selon laquelle l’héritier qui est appelé avec d’autres à recueillir une succession doit remettre dans la masse successorale les biens qui lui ont été donnés ou légués par le de cujus.
And (2) Dalloz Répertoire Pratique Vo. “Succession”notes 758 and 783 : -.
ART. 1 e r - PAR QUI ET QUAND EST DU LE RAPPORT
758. Le rapport est dû par tout héritier ab intestat (C. civ. art. 843), par l’héritier bénéficiaire aussi bien que par l’héritier pur et simple (Civ. 16 juin 1896, D.P. 98.1.267 - V. aussi Civ. 16 nov. 1824, R. 1281; 13 avr. 1842, R. 1059; Paris, 8 févr. 1897, D.P. 97.2.285), par un héritier e la ligne collatérale comme par l’enfant naturel. Il est également dû par celui qui n’était pas héritier présomptif au moment de la donation et qui se trouve être successible au moment de l’ouverture de la succession (C. civ. art. 846), ou par les héritiers du donataire qui viennent à la succession.
ART. 2 - A QUI EST DU LE RAPPORT
783. En principe, le droit d’exiger le rapport n’appartient qu’à ceux qui y seraient eux-mêmes soumis, s’ils avaient reçu des libéralités du défunt .Le rapport des libéralités n’est donc dû qu’aux héritiers ab intestat (C.civ. art. 857), sans qu’il y ait, d’ailleurs, à distinguer entre l’héritier pur et simple et l’héritier bénéficiaire, entre les héritiers légitimes et les héritiers naturels.
Il ne peut être exigé ni par l’héritier qui renonce à la succession, celui-ci étant censé n’avoir jamais eu la qualité d’héritier (Limoges, 14 juill. 1818,R. 1070; Req. 5 mars 1856, D.P. 56.1.97 - AUBRY ET RAU, t.10 § 629,p.275; BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE ET WAHL, t.3, No. 2724;DEMOLOMBE, t.16, Nos. 172 et s.; HUC, t.5, No. 374; LAURENT, t.10,No. 584), ni par le successible exclu de la succession comme indigne(Mêmes auteurs), ni par le conjoint survivant.
Has defendant No. 1 benefitted from the alleged sale? I do not agree with the contention of learned Counsel for the plaintiffs. What constitutes a “donation indirecte” has been clearly explained in Jurisclasseur Civil Vo. “Succession” note 41:-
41. Les donations indirectes sont également soumises au rapport puisqu’elles se rattachent indiscutablement à la catégorie juridique des donations et que, par ailleurs, elles sont expressément visées par l’article 843, alinéa 1 du Code civil. Il s’agit là de libéralités entres vifs faites ouvertement et sans aucune dissumulation mais résultant d’actes juridiques qui ne sont pas des donations au sens précis du terme. Tel est le cas, par exemple, d’une remise de dette faite par le de cujus à l’un de ses successibles (Cass. req. 24 nov.1858: D.P. 59.1.33); de la renonciation à un droit faite par le de cujus en faveur d’une succession (Cass. civ. 8 mars 1858: D.P.58.1.97); d’un legs; d’une part de communauté; d’un usufruit(Cass. civ. 27 oct. 1886: D.P. 87.1.129); d’une vente consentie au successible dans des conditions particulièrement avantageuses(Cass. civ. 28 juill. 1913: D.P. 1917.1.58); du paiement par le de cujus des dettes de l’un de ses successibles (cas prévu par l’article851); d’une acquisition faite par le de cujus avec ses propers deniers au nom de l’un de ses héritiers (Paris 15 janv. 1957:D.1958, somm. 107); de l’acquisition effectuée par un héritier dans des circonstances permettant de penser que le prix avait été payé à l’aide de fonds fournis par le de cujus (Paris 2e. ch, 28 juill. 1971:Juris Data n. 25695) etc.
Les juges du fond exercent, pour apprécier la preuve de la donation indirecte, un pouvoir souverain d’appréciation. C’est en exerçant son pouvoir souverain d’appréciation et sans intervertir la charge de la preuve qu’une cour d’appel a estimé que les prix des acquisitions faites par certains des enfants appelés à la succession de leurs parents n’avaient pu être payé que grâce à des fonds fournis par ces derniers ou des profits provenant de l’exploitation commune, dans le cadre d’une société de fait, de diverses propriétés rurales. En décidant que les prix de ces acquisitions devaient être rapportés à la succession, elle a fait une exacte application de l’article 854 du Code civil (Cass. civ. I, 22 nov.1978, cts Cardon c. cts Cardon: D.S. 1979, inf. rap. 258. – Sur l’article 854 du Code civil V. infra n. 59 s.).
I find in this respect relevant Jurisclasseur Civil Vo. “Succession” Rapports Fasc A “2 o . Rapport pour autrui” (C. civ. art. 847 et 849), note 148 which reads thus:-
148. Le principe posé par les articles 847 et 849 du Code civil est que l’héritier n’est tenu de rapporter que ce qui lui a été personnellement donné. Il ne doit pas le rapport pour autrui même si le gratifié est une personne très proche de lui par le sang ou par l’alliance et s’il a pu, de ce fait, profiter plus ou moins largement du bien objet de la libéralité. Cette règle, qui paraît aujourd’hui très naturelle, est exprimée d’une manière complexe par les articles 847 et 849 du Code civil qui disposent que les dons ou legs faits à une autre personne que le successible (père, fils ou conjoint)...”sont toujours réputés faits avec dispense de rapport”. La raison de cette formule se trouve dans notre ancien droit qui, dans une grande majorité de coutumes, interdisait au disposant de dispenser ses héritiers du rapport....Pour éluder cette règle gênante le donateur, au lieu de faire la libéralité au successible qu’il entendait gratifier, l’adressait à un proche parent de celui-ci pris comme personne interposée et chargée de faire parvenir le don à son véritable destinataire. Et c’est pour déjouer de tels calculs que de nombreuses coutumes établirent des présomptions d’interposition de personnes de telle sorte que l’héritier devait rapporter ce qui avait été donné à ses père et mère, à ses enfants ou à son conjoint car ces donations étaient présumées lui avoir été faites au travers des personnes interposées... c’était ce qu’on appelait le rapport pour autrui.
I consequently hold that the sale does not amount to a “donation déguisée” and dismiss the case against defendant No. 1, with costs.
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