Les Différentes Formes pour faire le Commerce à Maurice avec leurs Avantages respectifs et leurs Inconvénients

1. Introduction

Les différentes formes sous lesquelles on peut faire le commerce à Maurice sont classés en quatre grandes catégories dont notamment : Les Sociétés, Les Compagnies, Le Trust et Le Soletradership.

Pendant la période coloniale française, l'île Maurice était en fait gérée par une société, "La Compagnie des Indes". Pendant l'occupation française, les activités commerciales et les institutions étaient régies par le "code de commerce". C'est seulement en 1810, suivant la Bataille Navale de Vieux Grand Port, que le Traité de Capitulation a été signé. Le traité dans son article 8 prévoyait que: "les habitants doivent conserver leurs religions, les lois et les coutumes".

Le Code de Commerce continua à rester en vigueur avec des amendements mineurs mais en parallèle, il fut introduit des lois anglaises sous forme d'ordonnances. Les différents types de sociétés étaient régis par le Code de Commerce ainsi que le Code Civil. Toutefois, ce n'est qu'en 1984 que Maurice entra dans l'ère moderne avec l'introduction d'un nouveau ‘’Companies Act’’. Néanmoins, ce n’est qu’au début du nouveau millénaire que le gouvernement a adopté des lois et des conventions plus en vogue. Par conséquent, en 2001, une nouvelle ‘’Companies Act’’ ainsi que le Trusts Act ont été promulgués.

  

2. Les Différentes Formes de Commerce avec leurs Avantages respectifs et leurs Inconvénients.

2.1    Sociétés (Partnerships)

La Société en Nom Collectif :

La société en nom collectif s’avère être une société de type familiale. Elle peut être définie comme une entreprise de deux ou plusieurs personnes connues comme des associés. Ces derniers ont la qualité de commerçants et se regroupent en vue d’une exploitation commerciale. Selon l’article 23 alinéa 1 du Code de Commerce :

 ‘Les associés en nom collectif ont tous la qualité de commerçant et répondent indéfiniment et solidairement des dettes sociales.’

Donc les associés sont tenus personnellement et solidairement entre eux et se font confiance d’où l’intuitu personae devient important au sein de la société. Quant aux apports faits par les associes, elles sont faites en argent ou en industrie.

Les Avantages :

• Il importe peu que les associés participent à la gestion de la société ou pas, ils acquièrent la qualité de commerçant dès la formation de la société.
• La société peut être constituée par acte sous seing privé ; ce qui signifie l’acte est rédigé et signe par les seules parties, sans l’intervention d’un officier public et donc dépourvu des frais de notaire.
• Aucun minimum capital n’est requis par la loi.

Les Désavantages :

• La société est dissoute si l’un des associés est frappe de l’incapacité ou de l’interdiction  d’exercer une profession. D’autre part, la société est aussi dissoute en cas de révocation  ou de la mort d’un associé selon l’article 34 alinéa 1 du Code de Commerce qui prévoit :

‘La société prend fin par le décès de l’un des associés, sous réserve de l’application des dispositions de l’article 1867 du Code Napoléon.’

Il est à noter que la mort d’un associé s’avère être un inconvénient seulement en cas d’absence de clause de continuation.

• La séparation des patrimoines des associés et celui de la société en nom collectif n’est pas réalisée de façon absolue. Les associés sont tenus personnellement des engagements sociaux. Cependant la nature de l’engagement  doit être justifiée pour que le créancier ait le droit de les poursuivre.
• Les associés sont solidaires entre eux. Une solidarité qui dérive de la communauté d’action et d’intérêt est une solidarité légale et en cas de poursuite dirigée contre l’un des associés, tous les autres y sont également concernés.

Selon l’article 32 alinéa 1 du Code de Commerce :

       ‘Les parts sociales ne peuvent être représentées par des titres négociables. Elles ne peuvent être cédées qu’avec le consentement de tous les associés.’

        

Donc en cas d’absence de consentement unanime, les parts sociales ne pourront pas être cédées, ce qui peut s’avérer être au détriment de la société.

La Société en Commandite Simple :

La Société en Commandite Simple est une société constituée par un ou plusieurs associés appelés les commandités, et un ou plusieurs commanditaires.

Les commandités ont la qualité d’associés et de commerçants et ils restent indéfiniment responsables des dettes sociales.  D’autre part,  les commanditaires ont la qualité d’associés et participent au développement d'une entreprise commerciale sans pour autant devenir commerçantes.

Les Avantages :

• Facilite l'association entre :
  - des personnes qui "ont des idées ou un savoir-faire" et qui sont disposées à prendre des risques en contrepartie d'une relative liberté d'action,
  - et des personnes qui ont des capitaux et qui souhaitent limiter leur responsabilité tout en disposant d'un droit de contrôle sur la gestion.
• La société en commandite simple, SCS,  a une structure légale très souple.  En effet, la SCS permet aux mineurs et autres personnes interdites, par exemple,  une personne qui a fait l’objet d’une condamnation de devenir associés dans la société[i](voir Annexe).
• Il n'y a pas de capital minimum exigé. 
• Les associés commerçants peuvent faire des apports en espèce, en nature ou en industrie.  Les commanditaires aussi, peuvent réaliser des apports en espèce ou en nature, tel un fonds de commerce.

• Les actions ne sont pas transmissibles sans accord des autres associés, ce qui garantit le caractère fermé de la société[ii](voir Annexe).
• La responsabilité des commanditaires est limitée à leur apport versé.
• Cet apport donne droit au bénéfice mais la participation en cas de perte est limitée à leur apport.

Les Inconvénients:

·         Les commandités sont indéfiniment  et solidairement responsables. La société peut donc se retourner contre eux en cas de dissolution pour le paiement de ses pertes.

·         La faillite de la société peut entraîner à la faillite des associés.

·         Il est difficile de céder les parts sociales. (Voir Annexe ii)

2.2    Companies

A Maurice, les ‘companies’ sont régis par la Companies Act 2001. La Section 21(8) prévoit que: « every company shall be deemed to be a commercial company ».  Il est également stipulé que toute entreprise est soit une ‘public company’ ou une ‘private company’.^[1]

‘Private limited Company’

Selon la ‘Companies Act’, ‘a private limited company’ ne peut pas offrir ses actions au public. Comme il y a un minimum de 1 et un maximum de 25^[2] membres, la structure de cette compagnie est beaucoup plus appropriée pour les petites compagnies et ou les entreprises familiales.

‘Public limited Company’

Cette entreprise est définie comme celle qui n'est pas une ‘private company’ et qui a à la fin de son nom, les mots ‘Public limited Company’, catégorisée comme ‘listed company’ ou ‘unlisted company’. Listed Company signifie que les actions de la compagnie peuvent être achetées ou vendues par le public sur le ‘Stock Exchange Market of Mauritius’.

Selon la ‘Companies Act 2001’, les ‘companies’ sont classées en quatre grandes catégories^[3], definies par sa Section 2 :

‘Company limited by shares’

Le terme ‘company limited by shares’ désigne une compagnie qui a des actionnaires dont la responsabilité envers les créanciers, est limitée au montant initialement investi, c'est-à-dire, a la valeur nominale des actions détenues par eux^[4].

‘Company limited by guarantee’

Ici, selon la Section 2(b) du ‘Companies Act’, la limitation de responsabilité des membres, prend la forme d'une garantie d’une somme nominale qu’ils s’engagent à payer en cas de  liquidation de la compagnie. 

Ces compagnies sont utilisées pour des organisations à but non lucratif, par exemple, à Maurice: le ‘Mauritius Institute of Directors’.

‘Company limited by both shares and guarantee’

Celle-ci est une compagnie dont la limitation de responsabilité de ses membres qui sont des actionnaires, est limitée au montant impayé sur les actions détenues par eux.

La garantie est limitée au montant qu’ils se sont engagés à contribuer  en cas de  liquidation de l’entreprise.^[5]

Unlimited companies

D’après la Section 2 de l’acte, les membres de ‘unlimited companies’ ont une responsabilité illimitée sur la somme investie par eux. De plus, leurs propres biens sont en jeu lorsque l’entreprise est liquidée.

Global Business Licence 1

GBC1 est une société spécialisée dans les affaires mondiales qui se fait à partir de l'île Maurice avec des personnes qui sont tous des résidents en dehors de Maurice et où les affaires sont menées dans une monnaie autre que la roupie mauricienne - Part X  of Financial Services Act 2001.

Global Business Licence 2

Une société détenant une licence de ‘Global Business Company 2’ doit être constituée sous le Companies Act  de 2001 comme une entreprise privée, mais elle ne doit cependant pas faire des affaires avec tout résident mauricien et ne doit aussi pas faire des affaires en roupies mauriciennes.

Les Personnes Morales du Secteur Public

L’Etat et les personnes du droit public peuvent créer ou gérer des explotations ou participer à la surveillance à cause d’une mission d'intérêt général.  L’Etat peut aussi entrer dans une société des capitaux comme actionnaire et comme administrateur.  Par exemple, à Maurice, on a le STC Act 1982, qui établit le State Trading Corporation, qui mène des activités concernant les produits alimentaires entre autres.

Les avantages et désavantages des compagnies par rapport aux  d’autres types de commerce^[6]

Les Avantages :

• Une ‘company’ est une entité juridique distincte de la vie personnelle de ses actionnaires. La responsabilité pour le remboursement des dettes contractées se trouve sur la compagnie elle-même, et non sur pas les personnes qui le gèrent.

• Une compagnie a une succession perpétuelle, indépendamment de la durée de vie ou démission des  propriétaires ou administrateurs. Elle continue à exister jusqu'à sa liquidation.^[7]

• En tant qu’une personne morale, une compagnie est capable de posséder des fonds et d'autres propriétés. Elle sera propriétaire de tous les biens qui lui sont conférés. Ainsi, la propriété de l’entreprise n'est pas la propriété de ses actionnaires.

• Par rapport aux autres formes d'organisations commerciales, les entreprises bénéficient d'un taux d'imposition inférieur.

Les Désavantages :

• Les formalités des entreprises de bonne organisation et le fonctionnement d'une société doit être suivie, de bénéficier des avantages d'être une personne morale.

• Paperasserie est un élément considérable de formalités des entreprises qui doivent être suivie. Rapports et déclarations de revenus doivent être établis et déposés à temps.

• La dissolution ne se fait pas automatiquement. Une société peut être dissoute volontairement ou involontairement. Mais la procédure est longue : la collecte des actifs d’entreprise, payer les créanciers et distribution des actifs entre autres.

• Les sociétés ont des conséquences potentiellement double imposition - une fois quand lorsque l'entreprise fait son profit, et une seconde fois lorsque les dividendes sont versés aux actionnaires. 

2.3    Trusts

La Section 3 du Trust Act de 2001 prévoit que "un ‘trust’ existe lorsqu'une personne («fiduciaire») détient ou a acquis en lui ou est censée avoir acquis en lui, que propriété dont il n'est pas le propriétaire dans son propre droit, avec une obligation fiduciaire de détenir, d'utiliser, de traiter, de disposer au profit de toute personne (un «bénéficiaire»), …". La forme la plus commune et flexible des ‘trusts’ offshore à Maurice est le ‘discretionary trust’ parce qu’elles comprennent des pouvoirs de placement étendu[8] donnés aux fiduciaires et qui respectent les exigences des clients internationaux. Les ‘discretionary trusts’ peuvent être combinés par les fiduciaires avec des Global Business Companies, où les termes du ‘trust’ peuvent prévoir que les fiduciaires ne doivent pas interférer dans la gestion de ces sociétés.

Les Avantages et Inconvénients :

• Peuvent servir à préserver l’actif de la famille à travers des générations.
• La responsabilité limitée des bénéficiaires et dans l'éventualité que le ‘trust’ est insolvable ; l’actifs des bénéficiaires ne pourront pas être saisis pour rembourser les dettes contractées par les fiduciaires sous le ‘trust’.
• Lorsqu'une personne transfère ses biens à un ‘trust’, ils sont protégés contre les revendications des créanciers cause par la faillite de ce dernier, par la structure du ‘trust’.
• Il peut être très coûteux et complexe à établir et administrer des ‘trusts’.

2.4    Soletradership

C’est essentiellement une exécution des affaires où l'individu mène des activités commerciales généralement en son propre nom. Le ‘sole trader’ est indéfiniment responsable envers les créanciers parce que le Soletradership n'a pas de personnalité juridique distincte de celle du ‘sole trader’ et parce qu’il n’y pas de limitation de la responsabilité. Par conséquent, le ‘sole trader’ reçoit pleinement les profits de l'entreprise mais est également responsable des pertes occasionnées. À Maurice, le statut de ‘sole trader’ est largement utilisé pour la conduite des affaires et est régi par le ‘Code de Commerce’ aux Articles 1 à 16. Le nom de l'entreprise du ‘sole trader’ doit être enregistré avec le ‘Registrar of Companies’ s'il en utilise un et il doit également déposer des déclarations d'impôt annuelles à la Mauritius Revenue Authority.

Les Avantages : 

• La forme la plus simple de faire des affaires.
• Un minimum de procédures est requis et le ‘sole trader’ peut mener des affaires pourvu  qu’il est légal.
• Le ‘sole trader’ a le contrôle total de son entreprise et ne doit pas aller au moyen de réunions d'actionnaires.
• La prise de décisions est rapide pour faire face aux activités quotidiennes et le service donne à la clientèle est meilleur.

Les Inconvénients :

• Le ‘sole trader’ est seul responsable de toute défaillance de l'entreprise ou des pertes importantes.
• Il n'y a aucune responsabilité limitée.
• La présence du ‘sole trader’ est requise chaque jour ouvrable pour prendre des décisions dans le cas contraire l’entreprise ne fonctionne pas. Il y a une dépendance sur le ‘sole trader’.
• En général, les ‘sole traders’ ont peu ou aucune compétence pour la gestion, pour le financement, pour la commercialisation, d'achats et de surveiller leurs activités.
• Cette forme d'entreprise n'est pas adaptée à grand niveau en raison de ressources limitées et de compétences.

3. Conclusion

La société offre à l'être humain le milieu humain dont il a besoin pour développer ses potentialités, en imposant à sa conduite les normes qui lui permettent de se structurer. La difficulté principale pour le choix d’un type de société tient à la nécessité d’un bilan global avantages-inconvénients, dressé par apport aux données d’un projet dont les contours ne sont pas forcément stables et toujours réfléchis.

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Bibliographie

Sites Web

Société en nom collectif

• http://www.dmp.finances.gouv.ci/pdf/les_types_d_entreprises_de_l_OHADA.pdf
• http://www.lentreprise.com/1/2/5/societes-de-personnes-avantages-et-inconvenients_18649.html
• http://www.vitaminedz.com/spa-sarl-eurl-et-societes-anonymes/Articles_15688_24431_43_1.html
• http://www.salonmicroentreprises.com/conference/document/c_document1_Entreprise-individuelle-ou-s.pdf

Société en Commandite Simple

• http://www.apce.com/pid594/scs.html?espace=1&tp=1
• http://www.belgium.be/fr/economie/entreprise/creation/types_de_societe/scs/

Companies

• http://www.mcci.org/business_procedures_setting_enterprise.aspx
• http://www.allbusiness.com/business-planning/business-structures-corporations/686-1.html
• http://www.ocra-mauritius.com/local/domestic-company.asp
• http://www.irsmanagementservices.com/en/more-information/About-Onshore-Domestic-Companies/
• www.investopedia.com

Trusts

• http://www.alliance-mauritius.com/trusts.php

Soletradership

• http://www.articlesbase.com/business-opportunities-articles/legal-issues-concerning-a-sole-tradership-443017.html

Lois Législatives

• Codes Annotes de L’ile Maurice; 3 Code de Commerce et Code de Procédure Civile
• Code Civil Mauricien
•  The Companies Act 2001
• The Trusts Act 2001
• The State Trading Corporation Act
• The State Insurance Corporation of Mauritius Act

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[1] Section 21(4) de la ‘Companies Act 2001’:” Every company is either a public company or a private company”.

[2] Section 270 de la’Companies Act 2001’

[3] Section 21(2) de la ‘Companies Act 2001’

[4] Section 2 de la ‘Companies Act 2001’

[5] Section 2 de la ‘Companies Act 2001’

[6] http://www.docstoc.com/docs/4621271/Advantages-of-Company-Form-of-Business

[7] http://www.rajputbrotherhood.com/knowledge-hub/business-studies/what-are-the-characteristics-of-joint-stock-company.html)

[8] La Section 49 du Trusts Act 2001

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[i] Article 7 du Code de Commerce Mauricien. Nul ne peut, directement ou par personne interposée, pour son compte ou pour le compte

                  1o d'une condamnation définitive d’au moins trois annees de servitude pénale;

                  2o d'une condamnation définitive pour une infraction révélant une fraude, une malhonnêteté, un détournement ou une soustraction de bies telle notamment que le vol, escroquerie, l’abus de confiance, le recel, le détournement commis par les dépositaires de deniers publics ou le faux en écriture privée, de commerce ou de banque.

Néanmoins, le Juge en Chambre peut, à la requête de la personne frappée de l'incapacité d'exercice prévue par l’alinéa ler, et le Ministère Public  entendu, lever l'interdiction formulée par ce texte lorsque la personnalité de l’anden condamné justifie désormais l’adoption d'une telle mesure ou lorsque le maintien de cette interdiction risque de présenter pour le requérant ou sa famille des inconvénients économiques d'une particulière gravité.

[ii] Article 43 du Code de Commerce Mauricien. Les parts sociales ne peuvent être cédées qu'avec consentement de tous les associés.

                  Toutefois, les statuts peuvent stipuler:

         1. Que les parts des associés commanditaires sont librement cessibles entre associés;

         2. Que les parts des associés commanditaires peuvent être cédés à des tiers étrangers à la société avec le consentement de tous les commandités et de la majorité en nombre et en capital des commanditaires;

         3. Qu'un associé commandité peut céder une partie de ses parts à un commanditaire ou à un tiers étranger à la sociétés dans les conditions prévues au 2. dessus.

INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW - THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

The IMF is the outcome of the Bretton Woods Conference of 1944, where the world leaders met to discuss about post World War 2 reconstruction and promotion of international trade. Since then the IMF has periodically adapted itself in the face of historical events and ideas to become one of the most prominent international financial institution.

From the outset it must be noted that prior to its creation, the IMF was influenced by events that had a major impact on its structure and functions. These were the Great Depression of 1929 and the failed attempt to create a similar institution under the Treaty of Versailles of 1918. These 2 events haunted the founding fathers of the IMF not to commit the same blunders and this resulted in the successful creation of the IMF to control the monetary policies of nations which was at the heart of the Great Depression that was characterised by high tariffs and devalued currency[1], and to lend money to countries with Balance of Payment difficulties. The IMF was created in the midst of the Second World War when the US was in virtual control of the world economy and consequently its financial structure was based on the US dollar that was pegged of the gold standard and the currency of all countries were in turn pegged to it. The IMF was heavily criticised during that period as being under US control in its lending decisions and tended to favour US allies.

However, in the aftermath of the Second World War, the rise of multiple economic centres around the globe saw the gradual erosion of US hegemony over world trade. More and more currencies became fully convertible into capital account and this exerted severe pressure on the fixed exchange rate under the Bretton Woods system. Thus in the late 1960s the Bretton Woods system had become unrealistic and was dissolved by 1973 due to the Vietnam War and the overvaluation of the US dollar against US gold reserves which were depleted. Floating exchange rates for currencies were henceforth adopted and the IMF was given the function to control exchange rate policies.

The Cold War also had significant impact on the IMF as the Soviet Bloc, under the command of Stalin, refused to ratify the articles of agreement and prevented the institution from gaining universal membership which only became possible only in 1989 from the fall of the Berlin wall and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Until then the result on the IMF was that the membership to the IMF was limited to first and third countries with the second missing. The IMF in those days was termed as being a ‘capitalist club’ helping only market oriented economies but a more serious reason for concern was the composition of the staff at IMF and its analytical work. Its analysis was mainly from the perspective of Anglo-Saxon economics which did not always suit the policies of third world countries and did not gain universal consensus. It was only the shift in universal membership in the 1990s that fuelled the broadening of the staff.

More importantly, the rise of Africa as a continent of sovereign nations had a major effect on the size and diversity of the IMF and called for the expansion of the Fund’s resources. The problem the IMF was faced with was that most African countries to which it had provided financial assistance had fallen into expanded arrears in their borrowing and to remedy this situation the Fund required countries applying for loans to develop their own strategies for generating economic growth and reducing poverty. In some cases, where the IMF imposed economic and policy decisions was at times seen as an over interference with the sovereignty of countries. It can however be argued that the IMF was right to do so and many of these countries were and are still LDCs and did not have the appropriate skill and logistics to draw up economic plans. Their problem therefore was more structural than financial.

It was the Debt Crisis of 1982 in Mexico which transformed the IMF, projecting it into the role of international crisis manager similar to that during the Oil Shocks of 1970s where many oil importing countries had to borrow from the Fund to cover their debts and avoid inflation of prices. Likewise in 1989, the IMF played a major part in restructuring the centrally planned economies of former Soviet countries into market economies. The IMF thereafter became the central agency responsible for the resolution of financial crises. The Asian Crisis, however, was daunting for the IMF and criticisms against the Fund were more intense as to what was the best solution to cope with the crisis. The Fund drew several lessons form it that would alter its future course of action. The globalisation of financial markets minimised the role of the IMF as financing by the fund became secondary for potential borrowers who by the 1990s borrowed a small amount form the fund solely to ‘catalyse’ other capital inflows. The Fund was used as a mere figurehead to convince creditors and investors that the country was a good prospect. Another effect of globalisation was that the membership of the IMF became divided into persistent creditor and debtor groups with no unity of interest, which weakened the status of the IMF as a credit union.

Nevertheless, while these events were moulding the IMF and in some cases pressurizing it to adapt to the contemporary world, economic theories also evolved and influenced the working of the IMF.

John Maynard Keynes being one of the founding fathers of the institution instilled within it Keynesian macroeconomic principles with the aim of using it to prevent recessions and high unemployment as witnessed in the past. It was also included in Article I of the IMF Articles of Agreement. However some critics of IMF policies argued that the Fund had drifted away from Keynesian principles by over emphasising on monetary and fiscal discipline. Similarly the Polak model[2] of monetary approach to the BOP developed in the 1950s was adopted by the IMF and formed the basis of macroeconomic policy advice advocated by the Fund. However, a decade later the Polak model was replaced by the Fleming-Mundell model as monetary and fiscal policies were no longer seen as alternative of stabilizing income. The emergence of monetarism as a theory of aggregate demand added little to the panoply of economic theories already being applied by the IMF. It only gained ascendance in the 1970s when high inflation was rife across the world and that the IMF’s major preoccupation later in century would be inflation targeting.

Even though the IMF’s decisions were at that time mostly influenced by economic models and theories, Supply Side Macroeconomics[3] never quite got hold of the Fund. Same was the case of New Classical Economics[4] formulated in the early 1980s. The Fund however did adopt surveillance activities on monetary policies of countries and exchange rates thereby laying greater emphasis on medium term policy frameworks. The fall of State Socialism[5] in the late 1980s and bold economic reforms to liberalise the economy of countries, literally paved the way for the IMF to ease longstanding conflicts between the Fund and its members. It made it easier to negotiate adjustment and reform programs to which previously met strong opposition. Still, in the 1990s the policy advice meted out by the IMF was severely criticised as being narrow minded with excessive zeal for ‘laissez faire’ economics. This, nevertheless, did not impede the activities of the Fund which continued in its pursue for price stability by using the monetary policy. It allowed the effective control of inflation which had become by now a global phenomenon and led to the adoption of more stable monetary policies.

All in all it is now clear that the IMF has gone through a ‘paradigm shift’ since its creation which still continues today, which has shaped it as one of the leading financial institution in the sphere of International Trade and Finance. Without these adaptations to the economic realities and events the IMF would have become marginalised. It is through visionaries like Keynes and White that the IMF saw the day back in 1944 and has since helped counter numerous economic problems without parting from its original mandate. This longevity of the IMF can also be explained by the relative flexibility of its Articles of Agreement which have from time to time been continuously amended to provide for better legal rules and consequently allowing the IMF to alter its mandate and objectives to suit that of the modern world and to act fast in crises. Even today the IMF has been called to the rescue of many countries suffering from economic difficulties due to the recent financial crisis of 2007 that swept across the globe beginning in the US. The IMF has been able mobilised colossal amounts from its resources in a short period of time to help countries in financial difficulties and mitigate the effects of the worst economic downturn since the Great Depression of 1929. Had there not been the IMF we would have surely seen the disintegration of the International Financial System and this eventually calls for reflection on a new global framework for financial regulation to prevent recurrence of such crises.   

  

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Bibliography

Websites

·        www.imf.org

·        http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7725157.stm

Working Paper by IMF

·        James M. Boughton, The IMF and the Force of History: Ten Events and Ten Ideas That Have Shaped the Institution, May 2004, WP/04/75

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[1] ‘The Beggar Thy Neighbor Policy’

[2] It provided that a country with fixed or managed exchange rate and an external payment deficit can resolve the imbalance by reducing domestic credit of the banking system by either fiscal or monetary means.

[3] Advocating drastic tax cuts and tax credits to encourage productive investments by corporations and achieve economic targets for growth in national output and employment.

[4] An extreme form of monetarism which argues that demand-management intervention by governments is ineffective even in the short run, and instead advocates far reaching tax cuts.

[5] Government control over economic activity.

Sources of Public International Law

Introduction

According to Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832), an English Philosopher, “International Law is the body of legal rules, norms and standards that apply between sovereign states and other entities that are legally recognized as international actors”.

In the above definition reference is made to legal rules, norms and standards but then we ask ourselves: From where does those legal rules originate? In International Law there is no Global legislature to enact law and World government as such to conduct the legislative process. Nevertheless even if International Law does not possess formal institutions responsible for law creation there are recognised and accepted methods through which legal rules and principles come into being as well as numerous ways by which the precise content of legal rules can be identified. International Law therefore emanates from these accepted sources.

Traditionally, international law is derived from various sources, which are listed in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (1946). It provides that:

1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:

a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states;

b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;

c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;

d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.

2. This provision shall not prejudice the power of the Court to decide a case ex aequo et bono, if the parties agree thereto.

Ex Facie, it is apparent that article 38 seems to be a mere list of the sources of international law. It is more a direction to the Court allowing it to consider and apply the sources when deciding disputes submitted to it. It is to be noted that article 38 does not provide a comprehensive list but rather limits the sources to be used in the settlement of disputes. Article 38 has in the past been subject to extensive debates and in 1949 the ILC purported to enlarge the scope of the sources defined therein. Practice of International Organisations such as the United Nations, the Security Council and the General Assembly resolutions are not mentioned as source of international law in article 38 when in practice they figure prominently in the judgements of the International Court of Justice. In the case of Nicaragua v USA (1986)[1], the Court referred extensively to General Assembly resolutions and stated that: “…it was never intended that the Charter should embody written confirmation of every essential principle of international law in force…” However, the reason for this omission may be for the simple reason that they are merely material evidence of state practice and this will be considered later.

In addition, article 38 gives no indication of the priority or hierarchy of the sources of international law, except the single reference to ‘subsidiary means’ in 38(1) (d). The order in which the sources are to be applied by the court is generally accepted as from (a) to (d). Nonetheless, in Nicaragua v USA (supra), the Court considered each source simultaneously and stated that: “Even if a treaty norm and a customary norm relevant to the present dispute were to have exactly the same content, this would not be a reason for the Court to take the view that the treaty process must necessarily deprive the customary norm of its separate applicability”. Globally, article 38 is a guideline which recognizes the sources of international law. It is however considered authoritative by the ICJ and States themselves; therefore States cannot ask the Court to decide a dispute on the basis of selected sources only. Equally under article 38(2), the Court is authorized to decide a case ex aequo et bono for the settlement of disputes. This was established in the Frontier Case (Burkina Faso v Mali) (1986)[2], where the government of Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso) and Mali agreed to submit to a chamber of the Court a dispute concerning the delimitation of their common frontier and the Court acceded to their request.

Before proceeding any further, it is important to make a distinction between formal and material sources of international law. A formal source of law is a process by which a legal rule comes into existence: it is law creating. In UK for example the passage of a bill through Parliament is a formal source of law whereas in international law, ‘custom’ is a formal source of law as it creates legal rules. In the same vein, treaties create law for the parties and are therefore also formal sources. Conversely material sources are not concerned with the formal act of law creation. It is those sources which are concerned with the substance and content of legal obligations, they are therefore law identifying. Practice of States and International Organisations, judicial decisions, juridical writings and General Assembly resolutions are all material sources of international law. Salmond effectively explained the distinction as follows: “A formal source is that from which a rule of law derives its force and validity. The material sources on the other hand are those which derive the matter. The material source supplies the substance of the rule, through which the formal source give the force and nature”[3].

Treaties:

Article 38(1) (a) of the statute of ICJ refers to ‘international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by contesting States’, as a primary source of international law. Oppenheim purported that: “The only way in which international law can be made by a deliberate act, in contradiction to custom, is that the members of the Family of Nations conclude treaties in which certain rules for their future conduct are stipulated. Of course such law making treaties create law for the contracting parties only”[4].

The above statement as formulated by Oppenheim contains the essence of treaties. Treaties are bilateral or multilateral agreements between two or more States in writing. They are the means through which States can create certain specific obligations and are at the same time respected as they are deliberate. Therefore in the case before the Court, the pleadings refer to a treaty between the two parties in part (c), is valid for consideration by the Court as it exclusively embodies the intention of the two parties to regulate conduct and obligations between States.

Article 38(1) (a) makes reference to general or particular treaties. Where treaties have been concluded by the majority of States, including leading Powers are called general treaties whereas those which are concluded by a few States only are called particular treaties. However treaties whether general or particular , are presently the most important source of international law and this is likely to remain so given the continuing efforts of the International Law Commission to codify customary law in treaty form. A treaty imposes obligations on the State-parties which must be carried out and failure to conform to the terms of a binding treaty will entail international liability unless a defense is available.

As a primary source of international law, treaties have certain characteristics which will differentiate it from the other sources and they are considered below.

The first characteristic of treaties is that they are voluntary, i.e., no state can be bound by a treaty without having consented either by signature, ratification or accession. Only parties to the treaty are bound by its terms. Of course, there are exceptions to this rule but are very limited. These include treaties for the delimitation of territorial boundaries which binds even non-signatory states. Such treaties are said to be valid erga omnes, i.e., against the whole world, as in the Case Concerning Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana v Namibia)[5], where the Court observed that: “...the law applicable to the present case has its source first in the 1890 Treaty which Botswana and Namibia acknowledge to be binding on them. As regards interpretation of the Treaty, the Court notes that neither Botswana nor Namibia are parties to the Vienna Convention on The Law of Treaties of 23 May 1969, but that both of them consider that article 31 of the Vienna convention is applicable inasmuch as it reflects customary international law”. The case of Botswana v Namibia established that treaties may develop customary law although the primary rule remains that a State cannot be bound by a treaty to which it is not a party even if its obligations under customary law are similar to those of the treaty.

Furthermore when a treaty codifies existing customary law as was the case with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and the Vienna Convention on The Law of Treaties, the obligation found therein will be binding on all States as those States may be parties to that treaty in the normal way and States who are not parties cannot exempt themselves for the states are bound by the same obligations which are found in the treaty. Many multilateral treaties are a mixture of codification of current customary law and progressive developments of that law. Most of the time, the intention of parties to such treaties is that the principles contained therein will guide the future conduct of all states. Therefore parties are bound by all obligations and non-parties are bound mainly by those obligations that have achieved the status of customary law. Consequently impetus is given to the formation of customary law. However not all treaty provisions can produce customary law. According to the ICJ in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (1969)[6], in order to extrapolate a general customary norm from a treaty provision, that treaty provision “should be of a fundamentally norm creating character such as could be regarded as forming the basis of a general rule of law”. In other words, the treaty provision alleged to give rise to custom must be capable of general application and must be intended to be the basis for future practice and it was therefore held that article 6 of the Geneva Convention did not embody or crystallize any pre existing or emergent rule of customary law.

In addition, customary law and treaties have equal authority as they are the primary sources of law according to article 38. Therefore if there is any conflict between the two it is the treaty that prevails. This characteristic of treaties is illustrated in the Wimbledon Case (Great Britain, France Italy and Japan v Germany) (1923)[7], where the Court while recognizing that customary international law prohibited the passage of armaments through the territory of a neutral state into the territory of a belligerent state, upheld the Treaty of Versailles, articles 380, which provided that the Kiel Canal was to be free and open to all commercial vessels and warships belonging to States at peace with Germany. In stopping a vessel of a state with which it was at peace, Germany was in breach of treaty obligations. It should however be noted that a new custom may supersede older treaties and new treaties may overrule existing customs as enunciated in article 53 of the Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties:

“A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law. For the purposes of the present Convention, a peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.”

Customs:

In any society rules of acceptable behavior develop at an early stage and international law is of no exception. Indeed, Oppenheim argued that custom id the foundation on which international law rests, as without customs norms of behavior would not have been crystallized into rule of international law. As it was pointed out in the Gulf of Maine Case (1984)[8], “...Custom is ideally suited to the development of general principles and it is always available to fill the void should the detailed legal regime of a treaty fail to gain universal acceptance. The process of customary law formation being derived from the practice of states and occasionally the practice of other legal persons is an ongoing phenomenon and its great advantage is that it enables international law to develop in line with the needs of the time”. 

Custom in international is therefore a practice followed by states because they feel legally obliged to do so. Custom must be distinguished from usage, such as acts done out of courtesy rather than out of obligation or a feeling that non compliance would produce legal consequences. Article 38 circumscribes customary law as ‘international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law’, therefore the court cannot apply any custom but only those of international order since it must be general practice accepted as law. 

However a custom may also be local or regional and applicable to small States inter se. As illustrated in the Right of Passage over Indian Territory Case (Portugal v India) (1960)[9], where there was a claim by Portugal of a right of passage based on local customs. The Court held: “It is difficult to see why the number of States between which a local custom may be established on the basis of long practice must necessarily be larger than two. The Court sees no reason why long continuous practice between two States accepted by them as regulating their relations should not form the basis of mutual rights and obligations between the two States.”

Furthermore Judge Hudson of the ILC[10] listed the following criteria for the establishment of a customary rule:

(a)    concordant practice by a number of States with reference to a type of situation falling within the domain of international relations;

(b)   continuation or repetition of the above practice over a considerable period of time;

(c)    conception that the practice is required by or consistent with, prevailing international law; and

(d)   general acquiescence in the practice by other States.[11]

But then we ask ourselves the question: How is custom distinguished from behavior which involves no legal obligation? The conventional view is that a rule of customary international law derives its validity from the possession of two elements: State practice and Opinio Juris. State practice includes, but is not limited to, actual activity and statements made in respect of concrete situations or disputes as in the Nuclear Tests Cases (Australia & New Zealand v France) (1974)[12], where the French Government issued a number of statements indicating its intention to cease holding further nuclear tests in the atmosphere in the South Pacific after the 1974 tests had been completed.

In 1950 the International Law Commission listed the following classical form of ‘Evidence of Customary International Law’:

-          treaties;

-          decision of national and international courts;

-          national legislation;

-          diplomatic correspondence;

-          practice of international organisations.

The list was not intended to be exhaustive but to provide a basis for discussion.[13] Reports of ILC therefore constitutes a basis on which evidence of customary law can be founded as it codifies practice of states, thus the reference to Report of ILC on the area concerned in (b) can be considered by the Court but in addition it must be supported by the requisite opinio juris.

However, the ICJ further requires the State practice to be constant and uniform as pointed out in the Asylum Case (Colombia v Peru) (1950)[14], where the Court stated that: “The party which relies on a custom…must prove that this custom is established in such a manner that it has become binding on the other party. The Colombian Government had to prove that the rule invoked by it is in accordance with a constant and uniform usage practiced by the States in question and that this usage is the expression of a right appertaining to the State granting asylum and a duty incumbent on the territorial State. This follows from article 38 of the Statute of the Court, which refers to international custom ‘as evidence of a general practice accepted as law’”. 

The same approach was adopted in the Lotus Case (France v Turkey) (1927)[15], where the French Government argued that there existed a custom in international law of which Turkey was in breach. After extensive research, no evidence was found to prove its existence and the stated that for the formation of customary law state practice should be ‘constant and uniform’. In the same vein, state practice must have some consistency, i.e., practice of states must be recognized by other states and must not encounter objections as was decided in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case (UK v Norway) (1951)[16], where the UK objected to the method applied by Norway to delimit its territorial sea. The Court concluded that: “the method of straight lines established in the Norwegian system, was imposed by the peculiar geography of the Norwegian coast; that even before the dispute arose, this method had been consolidated by a constant and sufficiently long practice, in the face of which the governments bear witness to the fact they did not consider it to be contrary to international law”. 

Nevertheless, in Nicaragua v USA (1986), the ICJ gave a different opinion where it indicated that it was not necessary that all state practice must be rigorously consistent in order to establish a rule of custom.

Also for a universal norm of customary law to develop, the practice of States must be fairly general. In other words, the practice must be common to a significant number of states as pointed out in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case, where it was stated that the rule must be “generally adopted in the practice of States”. Again, ironically, a divergent statement was given by the ICJ in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (1969), where it was stated that all States need not participate before a general practice can become law. This may be justified by the fact that many States may have no interest in the subject matter of the rule. It would rather require uniformity of practice between those States whose interests are specifically affected by the subject matter of the rule as in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (1969), where it was held that: “…State practice, including that of States whose interests are specially affected, should have been both extensive and virtually uniform…” On the other hand a State may contract out of a development of a customary rule of international law by persistently objecting to its formation known as the concept of ‘persistent objector’, or adopts contrary practice. 

Then in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (1969), the Court held that: “Even without the passage of any considerable period of time, a very widespread and representative participation in the (practice) might suffice of itself…Although the passage of only a short period of time is not necessarily, of itself, a bar to the formation of a new rule of customary law… within the period in question, short though it might be, state practice… should have been both extensive and virtually uniform”. There is therefore in the words of the ICJ, no time limit and no demand, that the behaviour or practice should have existed since time immemorial.

In addition to State practice, an alleged rule of customary international law also requires an Opinio Juris Sive Neccesitatis or simply opinio juris. It is not enough for the formation of customary law that there is general, uniform and consistent state practice. In order that this practice constitutes law, States must recognize it as binding upon them as law. This was the stand of the ICJ in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (supra), where it stated: “…to constitute the opinio juris…two conditions must be fulfilled. Not only must the acts concerned amount to a settled practice, but they must also be such, or be carried out in such a way, as to be evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it. The need for such a belief, i.e. the existence of a subjective element, is implicit in the very notion of the opinio juris sive necessitatis. The states concerned must therefore feel that they are conforming to what amounts to a legal obligation”. 

The same view was adopted by the Court in the Lotus Case (France v Turkey) (1927)[17], where it stated that: “Even if the rarity of judicial decision to be found…were sufficient to prove…the circumstances alleged…it would merely show that States had often, in Practice, abstained from instituting criminal proceedings and not that they recognized themselves as being obliged to do so; for only if such abstention were based on their being conscious of having a duty to abstain would it be possible to speak of an international custom. The alleged fact does not allow one to infer that States have been conscious of having such a duty; on the other hand…there are other circumstances calculated to show that the contrary is true.” It was here emphasized that opinio juris is an important element in the formation of customary law and could not be inferred from a particular pattern of practice unless the state involved was conscious of having a duty in that regard. 

This was reiterated in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, where a majority of the Court stated that: “The frequency or even habitual character of the acts is not in itself enough. There are many international acts, e.g. in the field of ceremonial and protocol, which are performed almost invariably, but which are motivated only by consideration of courtesy, convenience or tradition and not by any sense of legal duty.”

Another interpretation in the literal sense of the opinio juris tantamount to “an opinion of law” which would include legal opinion of jurists of States on the area concerned with the formation of a customary rule of international law and this could be considered when determining whether or not the State deemed to be under a legal obligation with respect to the custom. Therefore the opinion of the law officer of one of the states referred to in (f) could effectively be used by the Court to assess the obligations of the State and form the required opinio juris.

General Principles of Law:

Article 38 of the Statute of ICJ refers to, “general principles of law recognized by civilized nations”. Sir Hersh Lauterpacht referred to this provision and noted that it was introduced by a commission of jurists in order to avoid the problem of a non liquet, i.e. an absence of rules in novel situations. General principles tend to be employed as a last resort, a supplementary argument in case the contentions based on customary law or treaties fail to convince, this was the view adopted in a UN Report of 2006 on “FRAGMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: DIFFICULTIES ARISING FROM THE DIVERSIFICATION AND EXPANSION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW”[18], where it was noted that: “the body of customary law has primacy over the general principles of law under article 38 (1) (c) of the ICJ Statute. This informal hierarchy follows from no legislative enactment but, emerges as a “forensic” or a “natural” aspect of legal reasoning. Any court or lawyer will first look at treaties, then custom and then the general principles of law for an answer to a normative problem”.

Regarding treaties, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969, in its article 3 provides that: “In the absence of any contrary provisions laid down by the parties and not inconsistent with overriding principles of international law, the conditions of the validity of treaties, their execution, interpretation and termination are governed by international custom and, in appropriate cases, by general principles of law recognized by civilized nations.” Therefore where customs fail to provide guidance, general principles will be used to interpret treaties. It must here be noted that the Vienna Convention on The Law of Treaties is in itself a codification of general principles. Then it has been questioned whether the principles referred to in article 38 are those of municipal law or international law? It is fairly well established that the general principles contemplated by article 38 are primarily those which reveal themselves in the consistent solutions to a particular problem as Lord Philimore, the author of article 38(1) (c) stated: “the general principles of law referred to were those which were accepted by all nations in foro domestico. This was decided in the case of Petroleum Development limited v Sheik of Abu Dhabi (1951)[19], where the umpire, Lord Asquith of Bishopstone, held that no municipal law of any particular country was applicable to the interpretation of the concession agreement and that the terms of the agreement" invite, indeed prescribe, the application of principles rooted in the good sense and common practice of the generality of civilized nations — a sort of 'modern law of nature' ".

Also Lord Oppenheim further stated that in connection with article 38 that: “the intention is to authorize the Court to apply the general principles of municipal jurisprudence, in particular private law, insofar as they are applicable to relations of States”. A number of decisions of the ICJ illustrate the nature of general principles. In the Chorzow Factory Case (Claim for Indemnity) (Merits) (1927)[20], the Court observed that: “…The essential principle contained in the actual notion of an illegal act-a principle which seems to be established by international practice and in particular by the decisions of arbitral tribunals-is that reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the consequence of the illegal act and re-establish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not been committed.” 

Similarly in UN Administrative Tribunal Case (1973), the ICJ, referred to: “…well established and generally recognized principles of law that a judgement rendered by a judicial body is res judicata and has binding force between the parties to the dispute.” In numerous case the ICJ has made use of the doctrine of estoppels as recognized by a number of legal systems. The best example being that of The Temple Case (1962)[21], involving Thailand (formerly Siam) and Cambodia formerly part of French Indo-China. The two states were in dispute over a section of the frontier, Cambodia successfully relied on a map of 1907 which the predecessor French authorities had produced at the request of the Siamese Government. The map clearly showed the Temple area as part of French Indo-China. The Siamese authorities, far from protesting at the error, had thanked the French for preparing the map and requested a number of copies. Furthermore, in 1930, a Siamese Prince paid a visit to the disputed area and was officially received there by French authorities. Together, these two events were seen by the ICJ as conclusive and it found that Thailand was precluded by its conduct from denying the Frontier indicated on the map.

The ICJ has also indicated that it considers the principles of equity to constitute an integral part of international law. In the Diversion of Water from the Meuse (1937)[22], Judge Hudson declared: “…What are widely known as principles of equity have long been considered to constitute a part of international law and as such, they have often been applied by international tribunals. A sharp division between law and equity, such as prevails in the administration of justice in some states, should find no place in international jurisprudence; even in some national legal systems, there has been a strong tendency towards the fusion of law and equity.”

Judicial Decisions:

In the eventuality of the Court being unable to solve a dispute by reference to treaty, custom or general practice, Article 38 of the Statute of ICJ provides as a ‘subsidiary’ means for the determination of law, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations. Judicial decisions may be applied subject to the provisions of article 59 of the same statute which states: “The decision of the Court has no binding force except between the parties and in respect of that particular case.”

In the German Interest in Polish Upper Silesia (1926), the Court stated that: “…the object of Article 59 is simply to prevent legal principles, accepted by the Court in a particular case from being binding on other states or in other disputes.” This provision prevents the establishment of stare decisis in international law even if a previous case submitted to the ICJ was decided between the same states or different states. However if a previous decision of the Court is law identifying and judicially consistent; the Court may refer to it for guidance. The material referred to in (g) can therefore be considered by the Court provided it is in line with the above and also if required at all because some decisions may have for object different subject matter. It is therefore left to the appreciation of the learned judges of the Court.

Article 38 does not limit the scope of judicial decisions only to those delivered by international tribunals. It takes into account decisions of municipal courts due to the fact that municipal courts deal frequently with matters of international law and provide evidence of state practice. They provide guidance and are law identifying, but not every municipal court’s decision will be considered. The case therefore referred to in (e), if relevant and consistent, will be given its due consideration by the Court.

Writings of Publicists:

Article 38(1) (d) of the statute of ICJ directs the Court to apply the writings of the ‘most highly qualified publicists of various nations’ as a subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law. During the early stages of the development of international law, the writings of publicists such as Grotius, Vattel and Gentili were of upmost importance in settling down the notion of the existence of binding rules that could govern the relations of sovereign and independent states. However, nowadays writings of publicists are no more regarded as authorities as it used to be in the past. It is considered as constituting a material source for practice of international law. Therefore the article from the British Journal of International Law by a university lecturer, referred to in (a) will be given little or no consideration by the Court depending on the subject matter of the case before it. Nonetheless such writings can be very useful to the Court when deciding cases on new treaties or conventions or also a completely new branch of international law such as ‘refugee law’, ‘international trade law’, etc. to shed light on moot points and therefore be pivotal for the identification of the source of law applicable. It is equally true that there is no statute book for international law regrouping all international conventions and thus textbooks and publications is an easier way to discover the current content of the law. Furthermore care should be exercised when deciding the work of the publicists to rely on because as pointed out by Judge Huber in the Spanish Zone of Morocco Claims Case (1925)[23] that: “Writers are frequently politically inspired and caution must be exercised when the country of the author has a special interest in a particular matter”. The outcome of which has generally been that the Court has till date refused to admit writings of publicists as source of international law.

Other Sources of International Law:

The UN since its institution in 1945 has adopted a number of resolutions dealing with many different areas of international law which have constantly expressed principles inherent to the international legal system. The General Assembly is essentially a political body, whose resolutions is adopted by its members and expresses the will of States. The most comprehensive was the declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among states (GAR 2625(XXV) 1970). 

In Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co v Libya (1978), arbitration arose after Libya had nationalized the property of two American Oil Companies, the arbitrator, Professor Dupuy, had cause to discuss the international relating to nationalization of foreign owned property. He referred to the General Assembly resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources 1962 (GAR 1803(XVII)) and the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States 1974 (GAR 3281(XXIX)). Resolution 1803 recognised the right to expropriate foreign owned property where it was carried out for reasons of public utility, security or national interest and where compensation is paid. It was therefore established that resolutions are capable of constituting rules of international law. However the primary rule is that resolutions of the General Assembly are not binding and States are not under an obligation to follow conduct stipulated in the resolution. Nevertheless, there is an exception to this principle namely resolutions on the internal administration of the United Nations as enunciated by article 10 of the UN Charter. The UN General Assembly resolutions referred to in (d) may be admissible as a source of international obligations, if it concerns the internal administration of the UN and secondly if they enlighten the Court on the content of the international obligations.

Conclusion:

International law therefore stems from the sources discussed above but is not limited to the article 38 of the Statute of ICJ. Much of it is under development and in the future new fields of international law with the likes of ‘international tax law’, ‘international investment law’, etc. will emerge following globalization and in an attempt to regroup the nations of the World into a universal legal order, free from conflicts between rules of law and institutional practice thereby giving the world a common outlook of international law.

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Bibliography

Books:

·        Textbook on International Law, Martin Dixon, 4^th Edition, 2000

·        Sourcebook on Public International Law, Tom Hillier, 1998

·        Casebook on Public International Law, Old Bailey Press, 1997

·        International Law: A Treatise, L.Oppenheim, 3^rd Edition, 2005

Websites:

·        International Law Commission- http://www.un.org/law/ilc/index.htm

·        International Court of Justice- http://icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=2

·        United Nations- http://un.org/en

·        Britannica Online Encyclopedia- http://www.britannica.com

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[1] ICJ Rep14

[2] ICJ Rep 554

[3] Salmond, Jurisprudence, 10^th edition, 1947, London: Sweet&Maxwell at p151-56

[4] L.Oppenheim, International Law, A Treatise, 3^rd Ed, 2005, at p22

[5] 1999 ICJ Rep131

[6] Federal Republic of Germany v Denmark; The Netherlands 1969 ICJ Rep p3

[7] PCIJ Rep  Series A No1 93

[8] ICJ Rep246

[9] ICJ Rep p6

[10] International Law Commission

[11] UN Doc A/CN4/163/3/50 at p5

[12] ICJ Rep p253

[13] 1950, ILC Yearbook at p368-72

[14] ICJ Rep p116

[15] PCIJ Rep Series A No. 10

[16] ICJ Rep p116

[17] PCIJ Series A No. 10

[18] UN Doc:A/CN.4/L.682, 13 April 2006

[19] 18 ILR 144

[20] PCIJ Rep Series A No 17

[21] ICJ Rep p1

[22] PCIJ Rep Series A/B No 70 p4

[23] 2 RIAA 615